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ABSTRACT

STRATIFIED NEIGHBORHOODS, STRATIFIED SCHOOLS: INTRADISTRICT TRANSFER AND RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC STRATIFICATION

Elisabeth S. Larsen
Department of Sociology
Master of Science

Intra-district transfer policies allow students to attend any school within a district
and thus may have unique consequences for stratification within a district. If parents
make choices based on common academic interests, this policy can create racial and
socioeconomic integration across the schools in a district. However, socially motivated
choices may lead to the creation of increasingly stratified zones. This study examines
one urban school district with an intra-district transfer policy to examine if the schools in
the district become more racially and economically stratified under the choice policy and
if the level of stratification at family’s zoned schools is correlated with participation in
choice. Results show that families zoned to schools mirroring the district’s diverse

composition are more likely to participate in choice, suggesting that more factors than
simple academically-based motivations guide choice behavior. Exploration of the levels
of stratification in schools with and without the choice policy suggests that the overall
trend is to maintain the level of stratification present in the residential areas. Although
most changes under the choice policy are small in magnitude, the changes that do occur
push the district towards increased stratification.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would to thank those who have made this study a possibility. Kristie Phillips
has been an excellent mentor and committee chair throughout my work on this project
and I am very grateful for her guidance and confidence in my abilities. My work with her
as an undergraduate introduced me to the possibility of graduate work in sociology and
she has introduced me to countless other opportunities since then. I am also grateful for
my committee members, Mikaela Dufur and John Hoffmann, for their helpful feedback
throughout the stages of this project.
I am also grateful for the constant support of my husband, Gerrit Larsen. His
willingness to always listen to my frustrations and successes about the project and read
through my numerous drafts have helped me stay positive and focused throughout the
program.

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ............................................................ 5
Stratified Neighborhoods, Stratified Schools .................................................................. 5
Why Stratification in Education Matters ......................................................................... 6
School Choice and the Potential for Integration ............................................................. 7
Barriers to Equal Choice Participation ............................................................................ 9
School Choice and Stratification ................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY ................................................................... 13
CHAPTER 4: DATA & MEASURES.............................................................................. 16
Data ............................................................................................................................... 16
Measures........................................................................................................................ 17
Student background variables .................................................................................... 17
School characteristics. ............................................................................................... 19
Measures of school stratification. .............................................................................. 20
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSES .............................................................................................. 23
Analysis of Stratification Indexes ................................................................................. 23
Hierarchical Cross-Classified Models ........................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION................................................................ 30
vii

Extent of Stratification in the District ........................................................................... 30
Influence of Stratification on Choice Participation ....................................................... 31
The Effects of Intra-District Transfer on Stratification ................................................. 35
School-level changes in composition. ....................................................................... 35
Neighborhood-level magnitude of change ................................................................ 37
Neighborhood-level direction of change. .................................................................. 38
Changes in stratification level. .................................................................................. 40
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 45
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 46
Contributions of the Study ............................................................................................ 46
Policy Recommendations .............................................................................................. 48
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 51

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Average Ethnic Fragmentation Values for all Schools in District,
2003-2007……………………………………………………………

59

Table 2: Average Dissimilarity Index Values for all Schools in District,
2003-2007……………………………………………………………

60

Table 3: Cross-Classified Model Examining Stratification and Intra-District
Transfer………………………………………………………………

61

Table 4: Difference between School and Zone Composition for Minority
Population……………………………………………………………

62

Table 5: Difference between School and Zone Composition for Socioeconomic
Status…………………………………………………………………

63

Table 6: Differences for Ethnic Fragmentation Index Values between all
Schools and their Corresponding Zones………………………………

64

Table 7: Differences for Dissimilarity Index Values between all
Schools and their Corresponding Zones………………………………

ix

65

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Plausible Values of Predicted Choice Probabilities for Average EF
Values of Groups A, B, and C…………………………………………..

66

Figure 2: Plausible Values of Predicted Choice Probabilities for Average D
Values of Groups A, B, and C…………………………………………..

67

Figure 3: Magnitude of Change in Socioeconomic Status from School to Zone… 68
Figure 4: Magnitude of Change in Racial Composition from School to Zone…… 69
Figure 5: Magnitude of Change in Socioeconomic Status from School to Zone,
Reflecting Direction of Change…………………………………………

70

Figure 6: Magnitude of Change in Racial Composition from School to Zone,
Reflecting Direction of Change…………………………………………

71

Figure 7: Comparison of EF Value Distribution for all Schools and Zones……

72

Figure 8: Differences in Average Ethnic Fragmentation Values by Group……..

73

Figure 9: Differences in Average Dissimilarity Values by Group………….

74

x

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In a stratified society, people are arranged hierarchically based on a variety of
characteristics such as income, educational attainment, power, race, and religion.
Evidence of stratification appears in social institutions such as education, where these
hierarchical distinctions greatly impact the quality of schools. For example, students
attending public schools in wealthier neighborhoods receive a vastly different type of
education than students attending urban schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods only a
few miles away (Wells et al. 2009). This hierarchical distinction between types of
education can exist across state lines, regions, or even among schools within the same
district.
Districts may be stratified on both racial and socioeconomic levels, and both types
are important to consider. In a racially stratified district, students attend racially isolated
schools with minimal interaction with students of other ethnic backgrounds. Such
interactions promote students’ comfort with students of other races and help break down
stereotypes, thus preparing students to live in a multicultural society (Holme, Wells, &
Revilla 2005). Socioeconomic stratification also has important consequences, as schools
with high concentrations of poverty may have diminished financial resources. Often,
levels of racial and socioeconomic stratification tend to be connected, but they reflect
separate issues of group interaction and resource allocation.
Over the past two decades, new questions of racial and economic stratification in
education have arisen due to the growing popularity of school choice options such as
magnet schools, charter schools, and intra-district transfer across the United States. Intradistrict transfer policies, which allow students to attend any school within district
1

boundaries, are one choice option that may influence stratification. As of 2008, this type
of choice has been enacted in thirty-four states (Education Commission of the States
2008). Intra-district transfer was also introduced as federal education policy with the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001. This legislation, which was aimed to improve the quality
of education by increasing school accountability, uses intra-district transfer as a
mechanism for students to leave schools that fail to meet these new standards of
accountability.
Despite the prevalence of intra-district transfer programs in the United States, few
academic studies have focused specifically on the impact of intra-district transfer policies
on school-level racial and socioeconomic stratification within a district. This makes
such a study particularly pertinent because these programs may lead to different patterns
of stratification than previously observed in other choice programs. Where charter and
magnet schools offer themed alternatives that often disproportionately appeal to narrow
racial and socioeconomic segments of the population (Cobb & Glass 1999, Wells et al.
1999), intra-district transfer offers choice to any school in a particular school district.
This lack of specialized schools and programs broadens the appeal of choice from
students with specific interests served by magnet or charter programs to the entire
population of the district.
With this broad appeal and level of availability to all students, intra-district
transfer policies have the potential to increase racial and socioeconomic integration
within a district. Because districts traditionally base school attendance zones on
geographic proximity, schools generally reflect the racial and socioeconomic patterns
already present in the district. Intra-district policies allow parents to send their children
2

to schools in any neighborhood, which can increase their exposure to students from
different backgrounds. If families from a wide variety of backgrounds base choice
decisions on common indicators such as academic quality, then the same schools will
attract students from across the district. Schools will then represent the diversity present
in the district rather than neighborhood demographics, which tend to be more
homogeneous.
However, intra-district transfer also has the potential to increase racial and
socioeconomic stratification within a district. Recent research indicates that parents who
participate in school choice tend to socially construct “school quality” to mean schools
with fewer minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged students rather than basing
their construction on academic quality (Holme 2002). In this case, parents from a variety
of backgrounds do not equally choose the same schools based on academic indicators.
They instead make decisions that either maintain existing residential racial and
socioeconomic patterns or actually increase levels of separation. If parents use their
choice options to either avoid high concentrations of minority and socioeconomically
disadvantaged families or to only seek out families of similar background to their own,
integration will not occur.
In studying the relationship between school choice and stratification, there are two
related and important issues to consider. In the first possible relationship between choice
and stratification, the existing level of racial or socioeconomic stratification at their zoned
school may prompt families to seek either more diverse or more homogeneous options
for their children. In this scenario, stratification (or the lack thereof) predicts changes in
choice behavior. The other possible relationship between choice and stratification occurs
3

when the school choice decisions made by families change the level of stratification at
schools within the district. Regardless of the factors influencing their decisions, these
may nevertheless alter the level of stratification. In this scenario, choice behavior leads
to changes in stratification.
Examining whether or not choice behavior leads to stratification fails to see
whether or not these behaviors may be motivated by social concerns, while examining
only the extent to which stratification levels predict choice behavior fails to assess
whether or not choice lessens, maintains, or increases divisions in the district. Thus, I
include both questions in my exploration of this subject.
Within the context of one city-wide urban district with an intra-district transfer
plan, this study examines the following questions:
•

To what extent are schools within this district racially and
socioeconomically stratified?

•

Are the levels of racial and socioeconomic stratification at a
student’s zoned school related to participation in intra-district
transfer?

•

How does the presence of intra-district transfer policies affect
racial and socioeconomic stratification of schools within a district?

4

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Stratified Neighborhoods, Stratified Schools
A major barrier to overcoming racial and socioeconomic stratification in
education comes from the highly segregated residential context in which most schools
operate. Rivkin (1994) theorized that the continued neighborhood racial segregation of
blacks and whites in America has been the primary cause of segregation in American
education. Over the past several decades, inner cities have become increasingly
concentrated with racial minorities and lower-SES groups while predominantly middle
and upper class whites have fled to the suburbs (Jackson 1985). In addition to this citysuburb segregation, race and class segregation within both the cities and suburbs remains
high as well. Segregation levels are particularly high for African-Americans, who have
become “hypersegregated” due to a series of deliberate, conscious decisions by majority
group members to deny them access to urban housing markets (Massey & Denton 1993).
African-Americans have the highest levels of residential segregation, followed by Latinos
and next by Asians and Pacific Islanders (Iceland, Weinberg, & Steinmetz 2002).
Patterns of residential separation exist with social class as well. As developers
tend to build neighborhoods with one style of housing, people of similar socioeconomic
levels settle near to each other. Adding to this pattern, the affluent have increasingly
dominated the purchase of new housing over the 1980s and 1990s, creating a disparity
between affluence in new housing and poverty in older housing (Dwyer 2007). When
districts assign schools catchment areas based on their surrounding area, the background
of the school also represents this racial and class stratification. Thus, districts tend to
have minorities and lower-class students clustered at specific schools rather than spread
5

across the district. In order for parents to send their child to a diverse, integrated school,
they must actively seek out such a school. Therefore, school choice operates in a highly
stratified setting and must overcome great barriers to achieve integration and equitable
outcomes.
Why Stratification in Education Matters
If school choice reforms cannot overcome high levels of stratification, it
maintains a system of education that traps certain students in the lowest-performing
schools. Typically, these students tend to be economically disadvantaged and/or
members of racial and ethnic minorities. Racially and socioeconomically stratified
schools tend to lack equal facilities and resources (Kozol 2005). Systems with such
schools have been found unconstitutional and discriminatory in several states, such as
Kentucky, Arkansas, Kansas, and Idaho (Haselton & Wells 2000). Students at these
unequal schools persistently lag behind not only in educational achievement and
attainment, but also in health-related outcomes such as receiving medical care and proper
nutrition (Campaign for Educational Equity 2008).
Choice programs that overcome stratification provide an array of positive short
and long-term benefits for their students. When students attend schools with a variety of
racial and socioeconomic backgrounds, students’ levels of comfort with other groups
increases and prepares them to live and work in an integrated society (Holme, Wells, &
Revilla, 2005; Killen & Stangor, 2001; McGlothlin & Killen, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp,
2006; Schofield 1995; Wells & Crain 1994). Other studies of integrated education
suggest that students, particularly minorities, at integrated schools were more likely to
graduate, attend college, and find higher-paying jobs later in life (Braddock & Dawkins
6

1993; Wells & Crain 1994). These studies indicate that stratification in schools denies
students a host of critical long-term benefits pertaining to their future success in
educational and social settings.
School Choice and the Potential for Integration
More affluent parents have often exercised school choice by simply moving into
neighborhoods with good schools while disadvantaged families tend to be trapped in lowachieving inner city schools (Holme 2002). The ability of choice programs to overcome
this stratification has been debated by proponents of two key perspectives. According to
the first perspective, the market model of choice posited by some economists, school
choice policies give low-income families the ability to break existing patterns by
providing parents equal access to whatever school best fits their student (Coons &
Sugarman 1977, Hoxby 1998).
The market model of school choice is based on the assumption that regardless of
racial or economic background, parents will choose schools based on the same criteria.
These criteria focus primarily on academic reasons such as academic performance and
environment instead of social factors like racial and economic composition (Hamilton &
Guin 2006, Hoxby 2002, Schneider, Teske, & Marschall 2000, Tedin & Weiher 2004). If
all families, regardless of SES level or race, choose to enroll in top-tier academic schools,
then these schools will be composed of students from a variety of backgrounds. Interest
in common academic quality indicators becomes a force for integration, breaking down
heavy concentrations of disadvantaged and minority students at selected schools and
diminishing stratification.

7

In contrast, a sociological examination of school choice behavior suggests that
concerns with issues of socioeconomic status and social comfortability may play critical
roles in guiding choices. Numerous studies demonstrate that predominantly white, upperand middle-class families exercise their choice options to flee high-poverty, minority
schools or districts while low-income families remain in their zoned schools (Ancess &
Allen 2006, Holme 2002, Lauen 2000, Saporito & Lareau 1999, Saporito & Sohoni 2006,
2007, Wells et al. 1999). If consideration of a school’s race and class composition guides
choice decisions, choice may actually increase stratification as families choose schools
with higher percentages of their own ethnic group and socioeconomic group.
Such socially-motivated choices are often based on a social construction of
“school quality” that also includes the school’s demographic composition, particularly for
white, middle and upper class parents (Holme 2002). Lankford and Wyckoff (2005) find
that white parents’ preference to have their children educated in schools with lower
concentrations of minority students is the dominant factor in urban school segregation.
These socially defined choices also extend to higher-class minorities, who want to avoid
sending their children to schools with high concentrations of poverty. When asked about
a district integration plan, a middle-class African-American mother replied, “If I wanted
to send my children to school with students from the projects or the trailer parks I would
have moved next to one” (Mickelson & Southworth 2005). When parents define a quality
education as one that does not include economically disadvantaged or minority students,
integration is an unlikely outcome of school choice.
These social constructions of quality may also extend to the neighborhoods in
which the schools are located. Parents are unlikely to consider sending their children to
8

school in what they have deemed a “bad” or “unsafe” neighborhood, regardless of the
quality of the school or the fit of the program or instructional method with their child’s
needs (Ancess & Allen 2006). Often, people base these assessments of neighborhood
safety and quality on neighborhood racial composition and consider heavily minority
areas to be less safe. Although this assessment may not be accurate or even conscious,
people socially construct their opinions of neighborhoods based on a history of the racial
stigmatization of urban areas that links minority status with poverty and disorder.
Interestingly, these ties between race and neighborhood quality predict not only
Caucasians’ assessments of neighborhoods, but those of minorities as well (Sampson and
Raudenbush 2004). Perceptions of both schools and the neighborhoods in which they are
located are informed by existing social constructions of quality and safety, which limits
the open choice theorized by the market model.
Barriers to Equal Choice Participation
Not only do the socially motivated choices of white and advantaged parents
hinder the possibility for integrated education, but in addition, the smaller proportion of
low-SES families participating in choice limits this possibility as well. Several factors
may explain these disproportionate choice patterns. First, when free transportation does
not accompany the choices parents make for their children, district size and access to
transportation pose a differential barrier to groups of varying socioeconomic status. In
large, county-wide school districts, attending some schools could require an hour and a
half commute or even longer. Thus, only students whose parents have the time and
resources for this long commute can take advantage of the full spectrum of choices within
the district (Bauch & Goldring 1995, Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005).
9

Moreover, limited access to information may pose greater barriers for some
groups than others. If districts do not readily provide information about schools or choice
programs, parents must rely on their own resources, leaving certain families at a
disadvantage. For example, parents who do not speak English, parents who work during
the school day, and parents who do not have internet access in their homes are all less
likely to know about their school choice options or about the process of participating in
school choice. These barriers tend to affect low-SES and minority families
disproportionately more than middle-income, white families (Mickelson & Southworth
2005).
Furthermore, without access to official information, parents rely on social
networks to choose the best school for their child (Neild 2005). Since these social
networks are most likely to consist of people with similar demographic characteristics,
the incidence of choice follows strong racial group or neighborhood patterns.
Socioeconomic status also plays a major role in shaping information networks. The
networks of lower-SES families are less likely to contain professionals that can help in a
school-related crisis or highly informed and educated members. (Horvat, Weininger, &
Lareau 2003, Schneider, Teske, Roch & Marschall 1997). Without these extra resources,
lower-SES families lack a major avenue of information and advice that might guide them
to higher-performing schools. Between the socially motivated decisions of upper-class
families and the disproportionate barriers to choice for lower-class families, the potential
for school choice to achieve integration is diminished.
School Choice and Stratification

10

Several studies have examined the relationship between various types of choice
programs and stratification with varying results. In the first type of studies, researchers
focus on broad trends in choice and stratification at the state and nationwide levels.
These studies tend to suggest patterns of increased stratification due to choice options.
At the national level, Caucasian students are most likely to enter private schools as an
alternative to public schools with high concentrations of poor, minority schoolchildren
(Fairlie & Resch 2002). This pattern of “white flight,” where white families flee schools
with high concentrations of minorities in favor of higher Caucasian populations, also
appears in other forms of school choice such as magnet and charter schools (Lankford &
Wyckoff 2001, Renzulli & Evans 2005). Saporito and Sohoni (2006, 2007) examine the
largest 22 districts in the nation and compare the racial and socioeconomic composition
of schools and their corresponding attendance areas. They find that public schools would
be less racially and socioeconomically stratified if students did not attend private schools
or public schools of choice.
Several state-level analyses suggest that when families send their children to
choice schools or programs, these settings tend to be more stratified than traditional
public schools (Booker, Zimmer, & Buddin 2005, Cobb & Glass 1999, Wells et. al 1999).
In Arizona, nearly half of all charter schools showed evidence of substantial racial
separation and typically housed a Caucasian population 20 percentage points higher than
the nearby public school (Cobb & Glass 1999). In these studies, school choice increases
stratification as students leave behind potentially integrated neighborhood schools for
more stratified alternatives.

11

Other studies narrow their focus to the effect of stratification on the composition
of individual schools and districts. Archbald (2004) compared districts with magnetbased choice policies to districts without choice and found that choice districts did not
display any higher levels of economic stratification than those without choice. This
suggests that choice policies alone will not greatly change the level of stratification
within a district. However, in a study of New York City’s small theme high schools,
Ancess and Allen (2006) find that common interest in an academic theme does not
override existing conceptions of “acceptable” schools and that the district’s choice policy
may actually serve to exacerbate stratification as families avoid schools in “undesirable”
neighborhoods regardless of the quality of the theme.
While these studies provide a good understanding of choice and stratification in
broad contexts, my study provides a more specific exploration of a particularly
compelling form of school choice that is rapidly growing in popularity with the context of
one specific school district. Intra-district transfer policies are particularly compelling as
their appeal goes beyond narrow interest-based schools and students can choose from
schools at all levels of academic achievement as well as demographic compositions.
Thus, it provides some of the greatest potential for districts to overcome stratification if
all students within the district base their choices on common indicators on school quality.

12

CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
Most studies of the impact of school choice policies on stratification focus on
districts which have previously been mandated by the courts to achieve racial integration.
In these cases, researchers seek to determine whether choice policies undo or maintain
the previous level of integration (Archbald 2004, Saporito & Sohoni 2006, 2007). As
more schools are released from their court desegregation orders and are no longer
required to maintain integration, the trend of assigning children to schools based on their
neighborhood of residence has been increasing across districts in the United States
(Orfield 2001). The increasing predominance of neighborhood schools calls for a new
focus of study that examines the impact of choice policies on a district whose schools are
already stratified along residential lines.
The stratified nature of the residential areas in the district where my study takes
place provides a compelling background to study questions of stratification and equity.
This small, urban district in the Intermountain West provides a diverse racial setting that
mirrors the “minority majority” patterns common in the Western United States
(Camarillo 2007). This district has 47 percent Caucasian elementary school students, 37
percent Hispanic, five percent Pacific Islander, five percent Asian, four percent Black,
and two percent American Indian. Approximately two-thirds of students qualify for free
and reduced lunch, indicating a high level of economic disadvantage within the district.1

1

For reduced lunch, household income must be between 130 and 185 percent of federal poverty level,
while student qualify for free meals when household income falls below 130 percent of the poverty level
(National School Lunch Program 2008).
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Although the population appears diverse, residential housing patterns in the
district are segregated, with most economically disadvantaged and minority students
living on one side of the district and the more affluent Caucasian students on the other
side. The area between these zones reflects a higher overall level of socioeconomic and
racial diversity, although the actual level of integration varies by neighborhood. Students
are zoned to neighborhood schools, which reflect these existing patterns of housing
segregation. Thus, schools in the district are segregated and furthermore, the district has
never enacted policies specifically designed to foster integration. Often, studies of school
choice and integration focus on districts that have been mandated to or chosen to enact
desegregation policies. This district provides a setting in which this has never occurred,
and thus the patterns achieved by choice do not reflect any current or historical courtmandated or policy-driven integration priorities. Therefore, this district provides a
context of neighborhood school zoning that reflects a current nation-wide trend and can
provide an illustration of the types of processes that can be expected under such a policy
as an example for districts just beginning such a policy.
Despite the existing patterns of school segregation, this district provides a “bestcase scenario” of a setting to test whether or not market models of choice are correct in
assuming that choice policies can achieve integration. The demographic makeup of the
students provides a situation in which no ethnic group makes up over half of the total
population and many groups are present. If each school mirrored the makeup of the
district, they would be integrated, unlike districts with a large majority group and a single
small minority group. Additionally, this district provides choice to both advantaged and
disadvantaged students on a relatively equal level. Of the 20 percent of the district’s
14

students participating in intra-district transfer, 50 percent qualify for free or reduced
lunch. Low-SES students are still under-represented; however, this sizable proportion of
choosers suggests that families of all backgrounds do exercise choice.
Additionally, contextual factors in the district diminish traditional barriers to
choice for low-income students. The small size of the district (approximately twelve
square miles) lessens transportation barriers prevalent in larger districts. The district has
had the choice program for many years and publicizes the program prominently across
the district. Therefore, lack of access to information is less likely to limit low-SES
families from choosing. When all families in the district are capable of exercising choice,
this allows for broader movement of all racial and socioeconomic groups. Otherwise,
low-income and minority families are more likely to stay in their zoned schools, which
high-income, white families may be unlikely to choose. Integration efforts are not
possible unless all families are equally likely to exercise choice, and this district is a
setting where such a situation may be possible.
Finally, this district provides an ideal context in which to study choice because
almost all students are able to attend their first choice school. Because few schools
operate at capacity, lack of space does not disproportionately limit the number of students
allowed to transfer to any given school. This allows me to accurately assess the nature of
families’ choice behavior and the demographic characteristics of the schools that they
choose to attend instead of the demographic characteristics of only their second or third
choice school. This lack of issues with capacity means that my study accurately depicts
the ideal demographic composition of a school for families participating in choice as
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opposed to other studies, which must deal with the complicating factors of school
popularity and program size when schools reach capacity.
CHAPTER 4: DATA & MEASURES
Data
The data used in my analysis comes from the official student records of the school
district. The data comprises four years of records for each student collected over four
consecutive school years. For each year the student attend a school within the district,
the data set contains information about the student’s demographic background,
attendance, participation in special education, English language proficiency, and
academic achievement. In addition to noting student participation in choice programs,
the district also identifies not only the school each student attends, but also the school
each student is zoned to attend.
For the purposes of this study, I narrow my focus to elementary school choice.
Because the district only has five middle schools and three high schools, students have
fewer choice options as they progress through school. In contrast, elementary students
choose from twenty-seven schools that reflect a variety of demographic backgrounds and
academic achievement levels. I exclude two types of students from my analysis: students
in self-contained special education programs and students in self-contained academic
programs.2 Due to the nature of these programs, these students attend one of the district’s

2

The district has four small self-contained academic programs. Two of these are full-day Extended
Learning Programs that each contain about one hundred students. Students must qualify for these programs
based on test scores; therefore, not all children may choose to attend them. The third program is a small
collaborative lab classroom with approximately forty students and the fourth is a one-hundred student
parent-cooperative program that became a charter school in the year following the study. All of these
programs share a campus with an existing school, but do not share a schedule nor are they counted on the
school’s standardized testing results.
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campuses, but never interact with the remainder of the student body and thus do not count
towards any measures of school composition.
This study examines approximately 13,000 elementary students per year for four
years, beginning with the 2003-2004 school year and ending with the 2006-2007 school
year. I chose this time period for two reasons. First, these years did not involve any
school openings or closings, which would influence families’ choice decisions as students
were zoned to new schools. Second, these years provide the most complete and accurate
data on a number of measures such as choice participation and language proficiency and
special education classifications. As English language proficiency may be a barrier to
choice participation and students with severe disabilities make choices based on program
availability, I restricted my time frame to those years with the most accurate
classifications.
Measures
The measures in this study include student background indicators and school-level
variables for the schools that students attend, the schools that students are zoned to
attend, and the residential zones that correspond to each school.
Student background variables. In order to determine whether or not stratification
predicts choice behavior, I created a measure indicating whether or not a student applied
for a transfer and was then granted and accepted a slot in their choice school. This
indicator is coded dichotomously, 1 for participating students and 0 for students who did
not participate.
I measured several student background variables including socioeconomic status,
English proficiency, disability status, family structure, and grade in schools.
17

Socioeconomic status measures whether or not a student participates in the free and
reduced lunch program and is coded 1 if a student participates and 0 if they do not.
English proficiency is also dichotomous and is coded 1 if the district classifies the student
as an English language learner and 0 if not. Students with severe disabilities are already
excluded from the data; however, the disability status variable measures students with
mild disabilities such as dyslexia or ADD in a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the
student has a documented disability and 0 if they do not.
Family structure is coded as a series of dummy variables assigning students to
either a two-parent home, single-parent home, or other forms of guardianship such as
living with grandparents or foster care. I use “two-parent home” as the reference group.
Grade in school is also a series of dummy variables representing each grade in
elementary school from kindergarten to sixth grade. I use “kindergarten” as the reference
group because a slightly higher percentage of students begin exercising intra-district
transfer in kindergarten, as kindergarten provides a natural transition time when all
students are entering a new school for the first time.
I classified all of these measures as time-variant because they all had the
possibility to change over the course of the study. Family income levels change over the
years, which may influence whether or not a student can qualify for free and reduced
lunch. After students have participated in English as a Second Language programs for
several years, they are no longer classified as English Language Learners, so this variable
must also be considered time-varying. Student disability level may change across years
if students are diagnosed in the middle of the time frame, and family structure may
change if parents divorce or remarry within the course of the study.
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I also measure time-invariant student background variables of race and gender.
Unlike the previous variables, race and gender remain constant across the four years of
the study. Student race is measured with a series of dummy variables including
Caucasian, Asian, African American, Native American, Hispanic, Pacific Islander, and
Other. I use Caucasian as the reference group. Gender is a dichotomous variable with
female students coded as a 1 and males coded as 0. Males are the reference group in the
analysis.
School characteristics. Two types of school variables are used in my analyses:
aggregated student data which provides information about the racial and socioeconomic
composition of the school, and school-wide achievement information provided on the
school report cards available from the state’s website.
When I use school data to assess how school attributes influence parent choices, I
use one-year lags for all school-level data. When parents make school choices for their
children, they must do so in advance; therefore, any school information available to them
for use in making a decision about where to send their children to school would be one
year old by the time the student actually attends a choice school. Test score information
from the state report card, which is public information that states are required by law to
report and is available at the state Department of Education website, was used to create
an academic indicator variable. This measure indicates the percentage of students who
reached the “proficient” level in their mathematics exam.3

3

I also created measures of the percentage of students reaching proficient in Language Arts and a dummy
variable indicating whether or not the school met AYP (Average Yearly Progress under No Child Left
Behind). As all of these measures are highly correlated with each other, I chose to use mathematics
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In order to assess overall district patterns in the descriptive statistics and to create
the measures of stratification, I first aggregated student-level data to create measures of
school composition. School SES was created by calculating the percentage of students in
each school that qualify for free and reduced lunch. School racial composition was
created by calculating the percentage of non-Caucasian students in each school. These
compositions were calculated both for the schools as well as for their corresponding
zones.4
Measures of school stratification. To measure stratification levels, I used two
different indices: the dissimilarity index (D) for socioeconomic stratification and the
ethnic fragmentation index (EF) for racial stratification. The dissimilarity index shows
the percentage of economically disadvantaged students that would need to be
redistributed to have the percentage at the school match the percentage of the entire
district. The index ranges from 0, which represents no redistribution of disadvantaged
students, to 1, which represents redistribution of all disadvantaged students. The
dissimilarity index gives one overall value for the entire district as well as a value for
each school that indicates the proportion of low-SES students each school would need to
provide. A school value of 0 indicates that the school’s composition exactly matches that
of the district, with increasingly high values representing increasing levels of
stratification. This measure is commonly used in studies of stratification and is ideal for

proficiency as research suggests that math achievement is most indicative of school quality while language
arts is more indicative of home background (Lee & Bryk 1989).
4
Here, “school” refers to the demographic makeup of the students that attend any given school after school
choices have been made. The corresponding “zone” consists of the children that are assigned to attend
each school based on their area of residence. This represents what the makeup of the school would be if
there was no choice policy in the district.
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studying stratification between two distinct groups (Archbald 2004, Reardon &
Firebaugh 2002). In this case, my two distinct groups are economically disadvantaged
students, who qualify for free or reduced lunch, and economically advantaged students,
who do not.
The formula for the dissimilarity index is
(1)
where ti is the total population in school i and T is the total population in all schools.
Similarly, pi is the proportion of school i that belongs to a specific socioeconomic group
and P is the proportion of that socioeconomic group in all schools within the district.
To study racial stratification, I use an ethnic fragmentation index. Traditionally,
studies of school segregation use dissimilarity and exposure indexes because they
examine historical contexts that generally focus on segregation between AfricanAmerican and Caucasian students (Archbald 2004). However, because the school district
in this study involves several racial and ethnic groups instead of simply a two-group
pattern, traditional measures such as the dissimilarity and exposure indices do not
accurately represent the levels of separation (Reardon, Yun, & Eitle 2000).
The most accurate measurement of segregation and stratification for this study is
the ethnic fragmentation index which is used as a standard measure of diversity in
empirical economics (Vigdor, 2002), in sociology and criminology (Bellair, 1997;
Sampson & Groves, 1989; Warner & Rountree, 1997), as well as in the popular U.S.
News & World Report’s college rankings and calculations of campus ethnic diversity
(Meyer & McIntosh, 1992). This index is often interpreted as the probability that two
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individuals randomly selected from the sample for which the index was created will
represent two different ethnic groups (Easterly & Levine, 1997).
The formula for ethnic fragmentation is
n

(2) 1 − ∑ s 2
i
i =1
This measure is calculated by subtracting the from one the sum of the square proportions
of each ethnic group in the district and is interpreted as the probability that two
individuals randomly selected from the sample will represent two different ethnic groups.
This provides a value ranging from 0 to .8, so in order to create a more easily
interpretable measure, I divide the values by .8 to create an index with values ranging
from 0 (a completely homogeneous school) to 1 (a completely heterogeneous school). I
calculate these values for not only the schools in the district, but also for their
corresponding zones to determine what the level of stratification in the district would be
without the intra-district transfer policy.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSES
This study used three types of analyses: preliminary analysis of stratification
measures, hierarchical cross-classified models, and descriptive statistics. I calculated
indexes of stratification to answer my first research question, which explores the extent to
which schools in the district are stratified. Additionally, these indexes provide a
dependent variable for my regression analysis.
I use hierarchical cross-classified models to address my second research question,
which asks if the levels of racial and socioeconomic stratification at student’s zoned
schools are related to participation in intra-district transfer. To explore my final research
question and determine the impact of intra-district transfer on stratification, I use simple
descriptive statistics to provide a general description of district conditions with and
without choice as well as further analysis of the results from the calculation of indexes of
stratification.
Analysis of Stratification Indexes
To determine the extent to which schools within the district are stratified, I use the
two indexes of stratification discussed in my measures section. The Ethnic
Fragmentation Index provides the level of heterogeneity at each school and in the overall
district. By examining the value for the school district, I assess the heterogeneity of the
population and determine the expected level of diversity for each school if all schools
mirror the district composition. I then assess the level of stratification by comparing the
individual values for each school to the district value and seeing how much they differ. If
schools differ greatly from this overall district value, this indicates high levels of
stratification.
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The Differentiation Index provides the percentage of students that would need to
be relocated in order for all schools to match the district average. I examine the value for
the district and determine the extent of stratification within the district by comparing this
value to previous effects in the literature, and then I rank the index values for each
school. If each school has a similar index value, this indicates that all schools contribute
equally to the level of stratification in the district, while a range of different values at
schools indicates that certain schools contribute disproportionately to the overall level of
stratification
Hierarchical Cross-Classified Models
To assess whether or not the level of stratification at students zoned schools is
correlated with participation in choice, I use hierarchical cross-classified models (HCM)
using all four years of district data. HCM is most appropriate in this situation because
students are nested within school zones. Therefore, error terms are not independent,
which violates a basic assumption of regression. I use a hierarchical cross-classified
model instead of a traditional hierarchical linear model (HLM) because students can
change school zones over the course of the study. In order to conduct HLM analysis, the
student would need to belong to only one zone over the course of the study. Because of
the high mobility rate of many students in the district, about 20% students change zones
over the course of the study. This high level of mobility violates the basic assumptions of
HLM and necessitates HCM analysis. (Raudenbush & Bryk 2002).
The outcome variable for my model is a dichotomous measure indicating whether
or not students participate in intra-district transfer; therefore, I employ logistic regression
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to estimate the effects of student and school level variables on choice participation. The
level-1 portion of my HCM analysis was estimated using the following equation:
(3) Yijk = π0jk + πijk TIME-VARYING STUDENT BACKGROUNDijk + eijk,
where Yijk represents whether or not at time point i, student j, who lived in school zone k,
participated in open enrollment, and π0jk is the mean likelihood of exercising open
enrollment for student j, living in school zone k. TIME-VARYING STUDENT
BACKGROUNDijk represents the regression coefficients relating to each of the students
background variables that vary over time: student socioeconomic status, language
proficiency, disability level, family structure, grade in school, and a growth trajectory
(coded 0 through 3 for the four years of the study). Lastly, eijk is the random effect, or the
deviation of ijk’s propensity to choose from the cell mean.
The level-2 model, or between-cell model, for the intercept—which includes all
row and column predictors—is as follows:
(4) π0jk = θ0 + γ01 TIME-INVARIANT STUDENT BACKGROUNDj + b00j +
b01LAGGED ZONED SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICSk + c00k
TIME-INVARIANT STUDENT BACKGROUNDj refers to the coefficients
associated with each of the student background measures in the analysis that do not vary
over time: student race and student gender. Also, b00j is the residual effect of student j
after controlling for the student characteristics in the model.
LAGGED ZONED SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICSk refers to the coefficients
associated with the three zoned school variables: the ethnic fragmentation index, the
dissimilarity index, and percentage of students proficient in math. The lagged zoned
school characteristics are considered column-level predictors within the HCM
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framework, and c00k is the residual effect of zoned school k after controlling for the zoned
school characteristics that are accounted for in the model.
All level-1 coefficients are fixed and therefore not allowed to vary randomly, as is
detailed in the equation below:
(5)

πpjk = θp

In this equation, πpjk represents the regression coefficients relating the TIMEVARYING STUDENT BACKGROUNDijk measures to Yijk, whether or not student j in
time period i in zoned school k participated in open enrollment. Here, θp represents the
model intercept, and it is also the expected value of πpjk when all explanatory variables
are set to zero.
Descriptive Statistics
In order to determine how intra-district transfer affects the level of stratification at
schools in the district and in the district overall, I use simple descriptive statistics
comparing the racial and socioeconomic composition of schools and their corresponding
zones as well as descriptive statistics comparing school and zone values for the
stratification indexes. These descriptive statistics provide a good indicator of the overall
racial and economic patterns in the district and how these change under the choice policy.
First, I examine the percentages of non-Caucasian and low-SES students in each
school and its corresponding zone and then calculate the differences between the
percentages at each school and its zone. Because patterns in the district are remarkably
consistent across years, I use the average difference for the four years. This provides an
indicator of how racial and socioeconomic composition at individual schools changes
under the intra-district transfer policy. I then group these average differences into
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categories based on the size of the difference to examine the general level of change
within the district.
Traditional explorations of district-level stratification examine the changes at the
individual schools and then examine the effects of these schools on the overall district
level. This type of examination best applies to previous situations wherein districts were
ordered to achieve integration and school zones were not based on residential
neighborhoods. In these cases, the court assessed the entire district on their level of
integration, so district-level patterns provided the most meaningful level of analysis.
However, in a district based on neighborhood school zones, the district level may
no longer be the only meaningful unit of analysis. While neighborhoods may not have
been a meaningful level of analysis under a system that achieved integration through
busing, they should certainly be considered in a system based on neighborhoods. Within
each district, there exist several unique neighborhood contexts that may be differentially
affected under the choice policy. Examining schools could be seen as an indicator of
neighborhoods; however, political boundaries such as school attendance areas are poor
indicators of neighborhood boundaries because neighborhood definition depends on the
perception of residents (Weiher 1991). Residents socially construct these definitions of
“neighborhood” based not only on geography, but also on demographic similarities
within the areas (Sampson & Raudenbush 2004)
In the context of this district, the schools are located within three broad
neighborhoods defined by location as well as by their similar demographic
characteristics, which I label Group A, Group B, and Group C. Group A consists of the
westernmost portion of the district, which also has high levels of disadvantaged and
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minority populations. Group B consists of the geographic center as well as a more recent
development in the northwest corner and has a more diverse demographic blend in terms
of race and socioeconomic status. Group C consists of the easternmost portion of the
district and is categorized by an overwhelming majority of Caucasians and the
economically advantaged. Nine schools are located in Group A, ten schools are located
in Group B, and eight schools are located in Group C. Grouping the schools into these
broader neighborhoods allows for an exploration of the impacts of choice at a
neighborhood level that is most fitting to a neighborhood-assignment policy.
I examine the average magnitude of change in each of these groups by
calculating the average of the absolute values of the differences at the schools in each
category. This allows me to assess the overall level of demographic change at these
schools, whether negative or positive. I also examine the average positive change, which
indicates the school becoming more diverse than its zone, and the average negative
change, which indicates the degree to which schools become less diverse, for each
category of school. I conduct this analysis at the group level to show how the effects of
choice might vary in different areas of the district and thus provide a more complete
analysis than one simply of the overall district.
These analyses provide an understanding of how school choice changes the
composition of schools, but analysis of the findings from the dissimilarity and ethnic
fragmentation indexes is necessary to determine if choice changes the level of
stratification. In order to do this, I examine the values of these indexes at each school
with and without the intra-district transfer policy and then compare the compositions. I
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again conduct this analysis by larger neighborhood group to expand my analysis from the
overall district level to the more specific neighborhood contexts.
In this case, inferential statistics are inappropriate because my analysis deals with
the entire population of the school instead of a random sample. Instead, I use descriptive
statistics and graphical analysis. Examining these patterns with graphs provides a solid
and appropriate basis for further analysis (Saporito and Sohoni 2006, 2007). Graphically
comparing percentages provides the best and most appropriate method for discovering
the impact of intra-district transfer on racial and socioeconomic patterns by providing a
visual representation of district patterns in a manner that is easily interpretable.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Extent of Stratification in the District
Given the residential patterns in the district as well as the district’s lack of school
integration efforts, it is not surprising that the district is diverse yet racially and
socioeconomically stratified. I find that the majority of schools in this district are highly
stratified, with particularly high levels of separation at the schools with the highest
Caucasian and advantaged populations.
The overall ethnic fragmentation index value for this district is .7979, which
suggests that the district is home to a diverse, heterogeneous, multi-group population. If
racial stratification did not exist in this district, one would expect all schools in the
district to have a similar index value. As Table 1 illustrates, this is not the case. Only
eleven of the district’s twenty-seven schools (41 percent) fall within a tenth of a point
range (.6979-8979) of this average. This suggests a similar racial composition to the
district and a high level of racial integration. However, the remaining 59 percent of
schools fall outside of this range, with 30 percent of schools falling underneath the .5
level. Not only are these schools far different from the overall district composition, they
could also be considered very homogeneous schools in a district that has the potential to
foster high levels of heterogeneity.
The dissimilarity index reflects similar trends. The dissimilarity index calculates
the overall percentage of economically disadvantaged students that would need to be
reassigned for all schools to reflect the district average as well as the contributing amount
from each school. In this district, 61.35 percent of the disadvantaged students would
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need to be reassigned in order for all schools to be equal. To put this number in context,
the average amount of disadvantaged students needing to be relocated in the 22 largest
districts in the nation was only 39.1 percent (Saporito & Sohoni 2007). Clearly, the
overall pattern within the district is one of high levels of unequal distribution. In
addition, this 61.35 percent of students is not equally dispersed among schools (Table 2).
The top third of school dissimilarity values make up 32.45 of the 61.35 necessary for
relocation, which is over half of that total while the bottom third of schools make up only
5.88 of the 61.35, which is approximately ten percent of the total. The schools in this
bottom third have a similar composition to the district average, while the disproportionate
share of the total accounted for by the top third suggests that these schools are highly
stratified.
Influence of Stratification on Choice Participation
Understanding that this school district operates in a stratified context, I explore
the degree to which school demographic characteristics influence participation in intradistrict transfer. HCM analysis assesses if this level of stratification influences choice
participation. According to the assumptions of the market model, parents uniformly base
their school choice decisions on factors of academic quality and school environment. If
this is the case, the level of racial and socioeconomic stratification at the child’s zoned
school should not be a significant choice predictor. Although this model cannot directly
assess why parents choose, we would expect to see the odds of transfer participation
increase as students are zoned to diverse schools choices if families choose based on
reasons of social comfortability, status concerns, or social constructions of school and
neighborhood quality based on racial and economic composition.
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Table 3 reports the results of the cross-classified analysis. This model shows that,
of the time-variant and invariant student characteristics, race, student socioeconomic
status and student language proficiency are all predictive of choice. Participation in the
free and reduced lunch program was associated with a 51 percent decrease in the odds of
participating in intra-district transfer (p<.001), while being an English language learner
was associated with a 19 percent decrease in the odds of participating in intra-district
transfer. These findings reflect the roles of socioeconomic disadvantage and language
proficiency as barriers to choice.
Compared to Caucasian students, American Indian students are 40 percent less
likely to choose (p<.01), Pacific Islander students are 22 percent less likely to choose
(p<.05), African-American students are 21 percent less likely to choose (p<.05), and
Hispanic students are also 21 percent less likely to choose (p<.001). Family structure,
mild disability level, grade in school, and gender were not predictive of participation in
intra-district transfer. These findings suggest that even in a “best-case scenario” in terms
of diminished barriers to choice, stratification still exists in parents’ ability to choose.
My study particularly seeks to examine the role of stratification in participation in
intra-district transfer, so the characteristics of students’ zoned schools are particularly
compelling. Of these, both the ethnic fragmentation (p<.01) and dissimilarity indexes
(p<.05) were significant predictors of participation in choice.5 A one-unit increase in the

5

The percentage of students meeting the proficient level in mathematics was not significant in this model,
which is likely because it was moderately correlated with both the EF and D indexes. In this district, the top
performing schools also have the highest concentrations of Caucasian and high-SES students, so any
measure of achievement tends to be highly correlated with these factors. Each additional percentage of
students reaching proficient level in mathematics is associated with a 7.5% increase in the odds of
participating in choice, although this finding was not statistically significant. This reflects the fact that
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ethnic fragmentation index is associated with a 485 percent increase in the odds of choice
participation, while a one-unit increase in the dissimilarity index is associated with a 100
percent decrease in the odds of choice participation.
Although these findings generally indicate that being zoned to a school with a
heterogeneous racial population or a socioeconomic population close to the district
average (essentially, diverse, non-stratified schools) predicts participation in choice, the
effect sizes are difficult to interpret. Thus, I calculate plausible values for each of the
neighborhood-based school groupings to give a more practical idea of how these
variables would affect choice.6 The three residential groups in my study7 have average
ethnic fragmentation index values of .6779, .7327, and .3054, respectively. Assuming
that students at a perfectly homogeneous school (EF=0) would have 14 percent odds of
exercising choice (the district average), being zoned to a Group A school would be
associated with a 46 percent likelihood of participation in choice, being zoned to a Group
B school would be associated with a 51 percent likelihood of participation in choice and
being zoned to Group C schools would be associated with a 24 percent likelihood of

schools with high percentages of students reaching the proficient level also have higher levels of
advantaged students. Thus, this finding does not reflect dissatisfaction with high-performing schools, but
simply an indicator that advantaged students are more likely to participate in choice.
6
Plausible values were calculated by raising the event rate ratio to the power of the average index value.
For example, the index value for Group A is .6779. I raised the event rate ratio (5.8568) to the power of
.6779. Then, I multiplied this number by .14, the average participation in open enrollment for students in
the model. This then indicates the increase in likelihood to choose that is likely to be associated with this
value of the ethnic fragmentation index.
7
In review, Group A schools have the highest concentrations of minority and disadvantaged students and
are located on the western side of the district. Group B schools have more diverse populations and are
located in the geographic center of the district as well as a more diverse recent residential development.
Group C schools largely consist of Caucasian, economically advantaged students and are located in the
eastern part of the district
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participation in choice (see Figure 1). Thus, being zoned to the most diverse schools is
associated with the highest levels of choice participation.
The dissimilarity index was also predictive of participation in intra-district
transfer. Assuming that students at a school exactly equal to the district average (D=0)
would have 14 percent odds of exercising choice (the district average), being zoned to a
Group B school would have the highest possibility of exercising choice, with a 12 percent
likelihood of exercising choice. This decreases for being zoned to a Group A school,
which would be associated with a nine percent likelihood of exercising choice, and
decreases further for being zoned to a Group B school, which would be associated with
an eight percent likelihood of exercising choice (see Figure 2). Again, although these
models do not directly explain why parents choose schools, they do indicate that zoned
school stratification predicts student choice. This indicates that parents may be making
socially motivated school decisions, which does not fit with the assumptions made by the
market model that academic quality (as measured by test scores) will motivate choices
and drive integration.
This model indicates that economically advantaged Caucasian students zoned to
the most diverse schools have the highest odds of participating in intra-district transfer;
however, this model does not indicate the characteristics of the schools that they choose
to attend as an alternative. Previous research of this district context (Phillips, Hausman,
& Larsen 2008) indicates that intra-district transfer participants choose schools with
lower minority and disadvantaged populations than their zoned schools, and that
advantaged families choose schools with substantially larger differences from their zone
than disadvantaged families. Coupled with the findings from my HCM analysis, this
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suggests a pattern of socially motivated “white flight” from diverse schools into more
stratified alternatives.
The Effects of Intra-District Transfer on Stratification
The HCM analysis suggested that social considerations may indeed be guiding
choices parents make about their children’s schools. Therefore, the extent to which
choice changes the stratification within an already segregated district should be examined
to determine if these patterns follow the hypothesis posited by the market model that
choice will create integrated, diverse schools.
School-level changes in composition. I begin this analysis by looking at trends in
the differences between zone and school composition at each of the district’s elementary
schools (see Table 4). These trends suggest that the majority of schools in the district do
not have a greatly different percentage of either minority or disadvantaged students than
their zone. Here, intra-district transfer seems to create schools that would be very similar
to the existing neighborhood composition. In terms of change in minority population, 67
percent of schools differ from their corresponding zone by less than three percentage
points. 19 percent of schools differ from their zone between three to five percentage
points and 11 percent differ between five and eight percentage points. The remaining
three percent represents one school that differs by 12.92 percentage points from its zone.
Compared to results from other studies, intra-district transfer does not seem to
create any higher of a level of composition change than other forms of choice. In fact,
the difference is much less than the 20 percent difference in white population between
charter schools and nearby public schools found by Cobb and Glass (1999). Saporito and
Sohoni’s (2006) analysis of the 22 largest districts found an average change of 5 percent
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in white students between the composition of neighborhood schools and their
corresponding zones.8 These studies claim these findings represent large changes. 86
percent of the schools in this district have a smaller change than five percent, which
suggests the intra-district transfer policy tends to maintain existing neighborhood patterns
more so than other forms of choice.
The changes in the population of disadvantaged students reflect a similar trend to
what occurs with race (see Table 5). Fifty-nine percent of schools differ from their
corresponding zone by less than three percentage points. Twenty-two percent of schools
differ from their zone between three to five percentage points and eleven percent of
schools differ between 5 and 10 percentage points. The remaining eight percent
represents two schools, one which differs by 14.47 percentage points from its zone and
one which differs by 12.12 points from its zone. Again, the majority of schools differ by
a small amount, suggesting maintenance of existing neighborhood demographics. In
context, the Saporito and Sohoni (2007) study of SES change in the 22 largest districts in
the U.S. finds an average percentage point change of 15 points between schools and their
corresponding zones. The magnitude of changes at the majority of schools in this study
is particularly small in comparison.
However, these schools with larger magnitudes of change could represent
meaningful differences when considered in the context of district integration plans such

8

It is important to consider that both Saporito and Sohoni pieces (2006,2007) also consider students
attending private schools. This study focuses solely on public school choice, although there are a low
number of private schools at the elementary within its boundaries as well as in nearby districts, thus
providing students with limited access to private education. As white, advantaged students tend to be more
likely to attend private schools, we would expect higher differences between zone and school in studies
with higher private school populations.
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as the plan in Wake County, North Carolina. In this plan, the district attempts to achieve
socioeconomic balance by making sure that all schools stay within ten percent of the
overall district percentage of disadvantaged students (Kahlenberg 2003). In this district,
school B1 experiences the largest differences between school and zone characteristics for
both race and socioeconomic status. In both cases, the characteristics of the zone (72.38
percent disadvantaged and 51.83 percent minority students) fall within ten percent of the
overall district average. However, as a result of the intra-district transfer policy, the
disadvantaged and minority populations grow to a degree that makes this school fall
outside of this ten percent variation. Most schools do not change to such a degree that
would enable them to vary so greatly from the district average. However, this school,
located in a diverse residential context, changes greatly enough to suggest that intradistrict transfer is capable of producing inequitable levels of change.
Neighborhood-level magnitude of change. Grouping the schools by neighborhood
factors helps explain broader trends in the changes between schools and zones. First, I
examine the magnitude of change for socioeconomic composition for each of the three
group indicators (see Figure 3). Schools at either extreme of racial and socioeconomic
composition had the lowest magnitude of change, with an average magnitude of change
of 2.32 percentage points for schools in Group A and an average magnitude of change of
2.29 percentage points for schools in Group C. In comparison, schools in Group B, the
most diverse geographic area, had an average magnitude of change of 5.97 percentage
points.
The magnitude of change for racial composition follows the same pattern of low
change in the most stratified neighborhoods with the highest amount of change in the
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most diverse area (see Figure 4). The average magnitude of racial change in Group A
was 2.4 percentage points and the average magnitude of racial change in Group C was
1.75 percentage points, compared to the magnitude of 4.38 in Group B.
These results suggest the importance of looking at neighborhood contexts within a
school district. Simply examining the average magnitude of the district assumes that
schools in all areas of the district experience the same amount of impact under an intradistrict choice policy. However, these results suggest that intra-district transfer has the
largest magnitude of effect in the most diverse residential neighborhoods. The more
stratified neighborhoods maintain their existing level of stratification with changes of
small magnitude, while the more diverse schools have the potential to vary more greatly
from their residential patterns.
Neighborhood-level direction of change. The previous comparisons show the
magnitude of change, but analysis of the direction of change is also necessary to
determine if schools increase or decrease their disadvantaged and minority populations.
In order to do this, I examine the average negative and positive change for each group of
schools for both socioeconomic status and race. Two distinct patterns effecting school
composition emerge from this examination of socioeconomic change. (see Figure 5)
First, both Group A and Group B schools overwhelmingly experience increases in
disadvantaged students as a result of intra-district transfer. Ninety-two percent of Group
A observations9 increase their percentage of disadvantaged students, while eighty percent

9

An observation counts each school each year. There are nine schools in Group A, ten schools in Group B,
and eight schools in group C. Each school is observed for four years, with a total of thirty-six observations
for Group A, forty for Group B, and thirty-two for Group C. For this analysis, I chose to use observations
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of Group B observations experience an increase. These increases occur at a magnitude of
2.5 percentage points for Group A observations and 6.65 percentage points for Group B
observations. In the few instances where observations experience a decrease, they do so
at a much lower magnitude of change, with only -.6 percentage points for Group A and
2.34 percentage points for Group B. These graphs suggest that the schools that already
have high populations of disadvantaged students are more likely to increase in these
populations, particularly in diverse areas.
In contrast, Group C observations are more likely to experience a decrease in their
percentages of disadvantaged students than the other two groups. Although 56 percent of
Group C schools do increase their disadvantaged populations as a result of intra-district
transfer, the 44 percent of these schools that decrease their disadvantaged populations do
so at a much higher level of change. These observations experience an average change of
–3.44 percentage points, compared to the 1.39 percentage point average gain. For these
schools that already have the lowest concentrations of disadvantaged students, intradistrict transfer further decreases this population.
The findings for race follow a nearly identical pattern (see Figure 6). 78 percent
of Group A observations and 73 percent of Group B observations experience an increase
in minority population as a result of intra-district transfer and these increases occur at a
much higher magnitude than any decreases that occur in minority populations. 59
percent of Group C observations experience a decrease in minority population as a result

rather than averages due to the possibility that a school might have negative change in some years and
positive change in others, and an average does not reflect this.
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of intra-district transfer, again at a much higher magnitude than any observations that
report an increase in minority population.
These comparisons suggest two critical findings. First, they suggest that although
the changes in school composition may be of a small magnitude, they occur in a way that
increases stratification as schools located in areas with the highest concentrations of
disadvantaged and minority populations experience an increase in the populations.
Second, these findings show the critical need of considering neighborhood contexts.
While schools in Group A and Group B exhibit similar patterns of a majority of schools
experiencing positive changes, this pattern is the opposite in Group C. Examining only
the average positive and negative change at the district level fails to recognize that these
patterns vary by neighborhood.
Changes in stratification level. These analyses extend the discussion of racial
composition to include comparisons of stratification level between the schools and their
zones. As discussed earlier, the overall ethnic fragmentation index for the district was
.7979 and the overall pattern was one of racial stratification.10 When comparing the
index values for the schools with the values for their corresponding zones, we see that
patterns for the district do not change greatly. Figure 7 compares the EF values for both
schools and zones in the district, and both groups follow a similar trajectory. The pattern
of school stratification is very similar with or without choice. Examining the difference
between the school and zone values for each school reveals a similar trend (Table 6).
Two schools have a difference from their zone of magnitude .1 or higher, but the changes

10

Because district racial and socioeconomic patterns remained very similar over the course of the study, I
combined the measures and report averages across the four years for all index values.
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for the other twenty-five schools are markedly lower, with ten schools having a change of
magnitude .02 or lower. With a magnitude of .02 or lower, these schools experience such
small change that they can be considered practically identical to their residential zones,
whereas the comparative amount of change in the schools with magnitude of .1 or higher
suggests a serious change in stratification level within the district context.
Examining the EF values by neighborhood group again shows similar findings
(Figure 8). A comparison of the average EF value for each group of school to the average
EF value from the corresponding zone shows that the average stratification values for
each group of schools are very similar to those of their zones. Group A zones have an
average EF value of .6997 compared to the school value of .6779, which suggests that the
schools are more stratified than the zones to a small degree. Group C schools reflect this
same pattern, with an average EF value for zones of .3221 and an average EF value for
schools of .3054. In contrast, the EF value for schools in Group B is actually higher than
that of the zones, with respective values of .7327 and .6416. Schools in this group
become more integrated under the intra-district transfer policy and the level of change
from their zone is higher than in the other two groups, again suggesting the need for
neighborhood-level analysis.
Typically, studies of school racial stratification have relied on D because they
deal with separation between only two racial groups. However, in this district and in
others with multiple ethnic minority groups, this index does not give an accurate
representation of stratification. Thus, it is difficult to directly compare EF index findings
with racial stratification findings from other studies. Instead, it is best to consider the
interpretation of the index, which gives the odds of randomly selecting two individuals
41

from two different ethnic groups. Group A has a difference of .0218 between school and
zone EF values, while Group C has a difference of .0167 between these values. This is a
minimal decrease in the odds of picking two individuals from different ethnic groups. In
contrast, Group B has a difference of .0911 between school and zone EF values. This
represents an almost 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of picking two
individuals from different ethnic groups in the schools than in the zones, and should be
seen as an indicator of substantial change in stratification level.
Analysis of the dissimilarity index findings corroborates the trend of small levels
of change in the degree of increased stratification. Earlier, I explained that 61.35% of the
district’s disadvantaged students would need to be relocated in order for every school to
represent the overall district composition. In contrast, only 55.44% of the district’s
disadvantaged students would need to be relocated if all students attended their zoned
school. This suggests that the patterns created by intra-district transfer create a higher
level of income stratification. The difference between these values is 5.91 percentage
points, which is higher than the average of 4.5 percentage points for the 22 largest
districts found by Saporito and Sohoni (2007). However, this value falls within the
middle range of their findings and is much smaller in magnitude than several of the
districts, as four districts have an increase of over 10 percentage points. Although intradistrict transfer does increase the level of economic stratification in this district, it does
not appear to do so at a higher level than is produced by other forms of choice.
Examining the difference between the amounts of students that would need to be
relocated from each individual school shows that most schools do not change greatly
from their zone (Table 7). Two schools have a difference of magnitude .01 or higher
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from their zone, which represents a high level of change, but sixteen schools have a
difference of magnitude of .003 or lower from their zone, which again suggests a
relatively identical level of stratification to existing residential levels.
Finally, I turn to the results from grouping the schools by neighborhood (Figure
9), which show a somewhat different trend. Group B schools have a value of .0094
compared to the zone value of .0095, which is practically identical. Group A schools
have a value of .0255 compared to the zone value of .024. The difference is small, but it
suggests that schools in this group are more economically stratified than their
corresponding zones. Group C schools have a value of .0362 compared to a zone value
of .0298. These are the most stratified schools and they also have the highest difference
from their zone.
There are two possibilities for what may cause this pattern. First, it may be that
only advantaged students in Group C choose other, even more advantaged Group C
schools. However, what is more likely is the cumulative effect of advantaged students
choosing schools from the next consecutive level. Previous analysis of this district
(Phillips, Hausman, & Larsen 2008) suggests that students zoned to Group A schools
would pick schools with lower disadvantaged populations, but in the range of Group B
schools. These students from Group A would help cover for the advantaged students
leaving Group B, who would in turn leave for Group C schools. As advantaged students
from both Groups B and C would be most likely to choose Group C schools with high
populations of advantaged students, this would explain why the difference between
schools and zones is particularly high for Group C. Overall, this represents a pattern of
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choice where families from each group choose schools with increasingly lower
percentages of disadvantaged students, leaving the majority of the impact in Group C.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
I draw three major conclusions from my research. First, students zoned to highly
diverse schools that mirror the district’s diverse population have a higher likelihood of
participating in the intra-district transfer program. If being zoned to a diverse school is
correlated with choice, then this counteracts the market model assumption that social
considerations do not guide choice behavior. It suggests that families may be making
seeking more stratified schools in order to have a greater proportion of students be similar
to their own child or that perhaps the high racial and socioeconomic diversity of these
schools does not fit in with the family’s social construction of a high-quality school.
Second, I conclude that the intra-district transfer policy does not have a large
overall effect on the composition and stratification level of schools within the district.
Although the schools in the district do indeed display a high level of stratification, these
levels tend to be reproductions of the stratification already inherent in the school zones.
The market model suggests that as all parents use the same information about school
quality to choose the best schools, this can create integration, while socially guided
decisions have the possibility of creating more extreme stratification. However, this
district upholds existing residential stratification levels without greatly exacerbating these
levels, with the exception of some schools in particularly diverse areas.
Lastly, I conclude that although change occurs on a small level, the changes that
do occur tend to push the district to a pattern of deeper stratification. The schools with
the highest minority and disadvantaged populations tend to increase their proportions of
these students, while schools with the lowest populations of these students decrease their
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proportions at an even greater rate. Thus, the schools with the highest existing levels of
stratification become increasingly more stratified. This seems to follow in line with the
idea that these decisions are socially motivated, at least to some level.
Limitations
This study is unable to determine whether or not choice behavior leads to changes
in stratification or if stratification causes participation in choice programs because I study
an existing social context where both of these relationships do in fact exist and occur at
the same time. Randomized field trials would allow for a better exploration of causality,
but they would not necessarily demonstrate natural social behavior. While my study
cannot determine causality, it does explore natural processes dealing with stratification
within a specific context.
The inability to determine actual reasons why families participate in choice is also
a limitation of this study. Such a study would require qualitative interview data to
discover family’s motivations. The results of the HCM analysis suggest that decisions to
participate in intra-district transfer are related to the racial and economic makeup of
zoned schools, but this cannot be directly assumed to cause choice participation.
Finally, this study does not address the characteristics of the individual schools
that change greatly from their zones in comparison to the other schools in the district.
This requires further examination. For example, there may be the possibility of a tipping
point of a certain population that motivates parents to exercise choice. There also may be
the possibility that the schools that change the most are those in nearest proximity to a
school with very different demographic characteristics.
Contributions of the Study
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The first major contribution of this study comes from its examination of the
relationship between stratification and intra-district transfer, a common yet understudied
form of school choice. Studies of other forms of school choice, such as charter and
magnet programs, suggest that school choice programs tend to greatly increase
stratification in schools and districts (Ancess & Allen 2006, Cobb & Glass 1999,
Saporito & Sohoni 2006, 2007, Wells et. al 1999). Studies also suggest that school
choice provides a means of “white flight,” as families leave zoned schools with high
percentages of minority and disadvantaged students (Lankford & Wyckoff 2001, Renzulli
& Evans 2005).
This study suggests that these patterns seen in other forms of school choice are
repeated under an intra-district transfer policy, although to a slightly smaller magnitude.
Analysis of the school and district compositions suggested an increase in stratification as
a result of the intra-district transfer policy. However, these magnitudes of change were
smaller than magnitudes of change reported in studies of districts with different types of
choice programs (Saporito & Sohoni 2006, 2007). Additionally, the results of the HCM
analysis coupled with previous district research uphold the finding of “white flight”
within the intra-district transfer context, showing that white families tend to choose a way
from diverse schools.
While these findings suggest that intra-district transfer provides a better choice
policy in terms of not increasing stratification, it is important to consider that intra-district
transfer also provides some of the greatest potential to achieve integration. School choice
under an intra-district transfer policy is open to all students in the district as opposed to
the limited number of students that can fit at charter and magnet schools. Also,
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participation in intra-district transfer is not limited to students who find the theme of
these specialty schools appealing, but is open to any school in the district. In addition,
the district context studied here provided a “best-case scenario” in terms of limiting
barriers to choice participation for minority and disadvantaged students. If all of these
factors promoting integration were present and yet the finding is one of stratification to a
somewhat smaller degree, this may suggest that school choice policies in general do not
foster integration.
Finally, this district shows the importance of considering social geography in
current studies of school choice. In this district, schools in the most diverse
neighborhoods experienced the most change as a result of intra-district transfer and
schools with higher populations of minority and disadvantaged students experienced
different trends in composition change than schools with high populations of white and
advantaged students. This finding suggests that some of the overall district trends found
in existing literature such as the Saporito and Sohoni (2006,2007) and Archbald (2004)
research may not accurately represent the impacts of choice in all areas of the district.
All districts operate in unique social and geographic contexts, and studies that fail to
consider this context may fail to recognize differences in choice patterns between
advantaged and disadvantaged or between integrated and segregated neighborhoods.
Policy Recommendations
The findings of this study have major implications for the employment of intradistrict transfer policies for districts previously mandated to integrate. The school district
in this study has always based student assignment on residential neighborhood and thus
provides an example of the types of patterns that such a system produces. As many of
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these previously court-mandated districts are moving to this type of zoning policy, the
patterns seen in my study provide an example of how school choice may affect other
districts as they attempt to use choice to foster integration.
Although districts may hope that intra-district transfer policies will allow them to
uphold their previous level of integration, this may not be the case. The school district in
this study provides a best-case scenario for achieving integration in terms of an existing
diverse population and many decreased barriers to choice for disadvantaged students, yet
socioeconomic status and minority make-up still greatly limited choice participation.
Under a court mandate, students were required to attend integrated school locations
regardless of their economic status. In an intra-district transfer program, disadvantaged
students are less likely to participate, which limits the possibilities of creating such a
level of integration.
Additionally, none of my findings suggested that intra-district transfer moved
schools towards integration. However, on the positive side, the intra-district transfer
policy also did not significantly worsen the existing residential stratification patterns for
most schools. If districts intend to use choice to create integration, this will not be a
likely outcome. They should expect instead that the stratification in their schools will
likely represent that of the neighborhood school zones.
If intra-district transfer policies do not create integration or equitable outcomes,
school districts actively pursuing these goals must seek other avenues. “Controlled
choice” plans that allow families to exercise choice but attempt to maintain a level of
balance within the schools may be a reasonable alternative to intra-district transfer (Henig
1994, 1996). Although districts cannot use racial guidelines, they may consider balancing
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amounts of students at schools based on socioeconomic status or area of residence. As
my results suggest that neighborhood schools tend to resemble their stratified
neighborhoods even with the presence of a choice policy, districts with such
neighborhood patterns may need to redraw their school zones to create a lower level of
stratification.
School choice and open enrollment policies—while they may provide parents
with more options for their children’s education—cannot be counted on to overcome
stratification. It will not overcome the differentiated levels of facilities or resources
particularly harmful to disadvantaged and minority students (Kozol 2005) or provide
students with the integrated educational settings that encourage intergroup comfortability
or provide minority students with the situations that encourage university attendance
(Braddock & Dawkins 1993, Wells & Crain 1994). Instead, they will likely maintain the
levels of stratification found in the neighborhoods that further disadvantage minority and
low-SES students.
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Table 1. Average Ethnic Fragmentation Values
for all Schools in District, 2003-2007

Schools

EF Index Values
0.8412
0.8348
0.8306
0.8300
0.8281
0.8266

A6
B1
A8
B8
B3
B10
DISTRICT

0.7979

B9
B6
A4
B5
A5
A2
A7
B4
B7
A1
B2
C8
A9
A3
C1
C4
C6
C3
C7
C5
C2

0.7519
0.7447
0.7373
0.7002
0.6996
0.6872
0.6820
0.6340
0.6254
0.6170
0.5508
0.5253
0.5201
0.4859
0.4629
0.3671
0.2807
0.2262
0.2021
0.1921
0.1868

Note: Ethnic Fragmentation values range from 0 to 1, with
0 representing a perfectly homogeneous population.
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Table 2. Average Dissimilarity Index Values for all
Schools in District, 2003-2007

Schools
C7
C2
C1
C3
C6
C5
A6
A2
C4
C8
A4
A3
A1
B5
A5
A7
A8
A9
B3
B1
B2
B6
B10
B8
B9
B4
B7

DI Values
0.0542
0.0395
0.0384
0.0375
0.0338
0.0332
0.0309
0.0306
0.0264
0.0264
0.0262
0.0261
0.0248
0.0241
0.0238
0.0232
0.0228
0.0215
0.0134
0.0126
0.0111
0.0107
0.0074
0.0057
0.0040
0.0033
0.0017

DISTRICT DISSIMILARITY=

0.6135

Note: The district dissimilarity ranges from 0 to 1, with a 1
meaning all disadvantaged students in the district would need to
be relocated. The individual school values show the proportion of
this total belonging to each school.
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Table 3. Cross-Classified Model Examining Stratification and Intra-District
Transfer
Coefficient Odds Ratio Std. Error
Variable List
Intercept
-2.292
0.101
(.79) **
Growth over Time
0.031
1.031
(.07)
Time Variant Student Background
Student Participates in Free Lunch Program
-0.713
0.49
(.05) ***
Student is an English Language Learner
-0.214
0.807
(.05) ***
Student has Mild Disabilities
-0.005
0.995
(.06)
Student Guardianship (ref = Two Parents)
One Parent
0.019
1.019
(.04)
Other Guardianship
-0.015
0.985
(.14)
Student Grade (ref = Kindergarten)
First
0.021
1.022
(.06)
Second
-0.004
0.996
(.08)
Third
0.058
1.06
(.08)
Fourth
0.023
1.023
(.01)
Fifth
0.117
1.124
(.08)
Sixth
0.094
1.099
(.08)
Time Invariant Student Background
Student Race (ref = white)
Asian
-0.065
0.937
(.10)
Black
-0.23
0.794
(.10) *
American Indian
-0.516
0.597
(.16) **
Latino
-0.231
0.793
(.06) ***
Pacific Islander
-0.247
0.781
(.10) *
Other Race
-0.403
0.669
(.49)
Student Gender (ref = Male)
Female
-0.013
0.987
(.04)
Zoned-School Characteristics
Ethnic Fragmentation Level
1.768
559%
(.54) **
Economic Dissimilarity Level
-16.723
0.001
(7.52) *
Percentage Passing Math
0.073
1.075
(.70)
Variance Components
Row Level Variance Components:
Intercept
2.477
(1.57) ***
Chi-square
26300.87
df
22357
Column Level Variance Components:
Intercept
0.607
(.78) ***
Chi-square
937.76
df
97
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
N = 49,718 Observations of 22,368 Students & 108 Observations of 27 Schools (over 4 years).
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Table 4. Difference between School and Zone
Composition for Minority Population
Schools
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

School

82.83
84.43
89.73
80.73
83.50
86.80
82.30
78.08
80.13

Zone
80.75
84.73
83.48
77.15
81.20
84.88
81.88
78.73
77.48

Difference
2.08
-0.30
6.25
3.58
2.30
1.92
0.42
-0.65
2.65

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10

64.75
27.65
74.03
32.65
78.48
61.53
33.30
70.03
46.18
62.55

51.83
20.80
74.20
29.30
72.68
62.65
31.98
70.18
41.80
59.00

12.92
6.85
-0.17
3.35
5.80
-1.12
1.32
-0.15
4.38
3.55

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8

22.10
7.90
9.70
16.38
8.05
12.30
8.58
25.03

24.43
7.70
11.43
17.33
6.90
14.70
7.50
29.03

-2.33
0.20
-1.73
-0.95
1.15
-2.40
1.08
-4.00

Note: A negative value indicates that the school has a smaller
minority population than its corresponding zone
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Table 5. Difference between School and Zone
Composition for Socioeconomic Status
Schools
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

School
92.88
96.80
95.88
94.38
92.43
94.58
93.85
89.75
89.23

Zone
90.43
95.38
91.53
91.65
89.23
92.6
93.15
89.3
86.93

Difference
2.45
1.42
4.35
2.73
3.20
1.98
0.70
0.45
2.30

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10

86.85
45.55
78.90
58.15
92.45
79.80
64.33
71.68
72.33
74.18

72.38
33.43
78.13
53
88.73
79
58.25
72.7
67.55
73.9

14.47
12.12
0.77
5.15
3.72
0.80
6.08
-1.02
4.78
0.28

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8

21.58
8.30
20.63
20.68
26.73
16.55
11.30
35.35

25.58
8.65
18.8
17.33
27.98
15.9
10.83
40.8

-4.00
-0.35
1.83
3.35
-1.25
0.65
0.47
-5.45

Note: A negative value indicates that the school has a
smaller minority or disadvantaged population than its
corresponding zone.
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Table 6. Differences for Ethnic Fragmentation
Index Values for all Schools and their
Corresponding Zones
Schools
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

EF Difference
-0.0390
0.0202
-0.1407
0.0067
-0.0150
-0.0175
-0.0143
0.0199
-0.0584

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10

0.0414
0.1048
-0.0129
0.0480
-0.0435
0.0209
0.0153
0.0072
0.0473
0.0403

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8

-0.0281
0.0047
-0.0387
-0.0157
0.0270
-0.0464
0.0242
-0.0602

Note: A negative value indicates that the school is less diverse
than its corresponding zone.
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Table 7. Differences for Dissimilarity Index
Values between all Schools and their
Corresponding Zones
Schools
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

D Difference
0.0013
-0.0007
0.0038
0.0014
0.0006
0.0012
-0.0002
-0.0013
0.0025

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10

0.0069
-0.0049
-0.0004
-0.0019
0.0035
-0.0004
-0.0028
-0.0022
0.0026
-0.0012

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8

0.0148
0.0046
0.0068
-0.0039
0.0097
0.0019
0.0053
0.012

Note: A positive value indicates that the school is less
diverse than its corresponding zone.
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Figure 1. Plausible Values of Predicted Choice Probability for Average EF Values of
Groups A, B, and C

66

Figure 2. Plausible Values of Predicted Choice Probability for Average D Values of
Groups A, B, and C
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Figure 3. Magnitude of Change in Socioeconomic Status from School to Zone
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Figure 4. Magnitude of Change in Racial Composition from School to Zone
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Figure 5. Magnitude of Change in Socioeconomic Status From School To Zone,
Reflecting Direction of Change

Note: One observation equals one school during one year.
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Figure 6.Magnitude of Change in Racial Composition From School to Zone,
Reflecting Direction of Change

Note: One observation equals one school during one year.
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Figure 7. Comparison of EF Value Distribution for Schools and Zones

72

Figure 8. Differences in Average Ethnic Fragmentation Values by Group

Note: The lower the fragmentation level, the more stratified the schools in this group are.
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Figure 9. Differences in Average Dissimilarity Values by Group

Note: The higher the dissimilarity value, the more stratified the schools in this group are.
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